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In a previous book, Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition
(University of Chicago Press, 1987), Howard Margolis
outlined a general account of belief, persuasion, and
judgment; in the present book, he applies the theory to
a set of case studies in the history of science. It is the
capstone of a long effort, with the goal of establishing
a plausible psychological account of Thomas Kuhn's no-
tion of paradigms and paradigm shifts, a psychological
account rooted in the workings of human cognition.
Since Kuhn has been seen as warranting only a social
account of scientific change, Margolis's book provides a
welcome slant on an old issue, even if (as he ac-
knowledges) the slant is not entirely new—Kuhn himself,
in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of
Chicago Press, 1962/1970) seemed disposed to account
for paradigms and paradigm shifts using psychological
as well as sociological principles.
Margolis's cognitive account begins with a reprise of
his earlier book (the first part of which is reprinted in an
appendix). He uses pattern recognition, the cued re-
sponse to some state of affairs within a context, as the
foundation of all cognition, the "atoms" or "genes" of his
system. These are construed broadly, so as to encompass
cued actions, mental or physical, as well as perceptual
recognitions. He then argues that sequences of such rec-
ognitions constitute the "habits of mind" that underlie
all thought. The parallel with physical habits (walking,
speaking) is made explicit, and the habits of mind that
matter for the present book are just those that add up to
a Kuhnian paradigm. To "see" the sun as stationary and
the earth as moving requires a collection of habits of
mind that, once learned, are resistant to change.
Disavowing recent computational models of cogni-
tion, which generally use one or another variety of sym-
bolic rewrite rule as a foundational principle, Margolis
allies himself with William James. In a sense, James
"peripheralized" cognition; his famous account of the
stream of thought as "like a river," rather than as com-
posed of discrete ideas and concepts, is close to Margolis'
view, as is James' view of "habit" as a learned mode of
thinking and doing. Both James and Margolis displace
thought from an autonomous "center" of mind, locating
it instead closer to the everyday sensory and motor
world. We think by doing, even in science, and that can
mean that we are as resistant (sometimes!) to new habits
of thought as we would be to new habits of, say, walk-
ing. Like James, Margolis argues that existing habits of
mind can constitute actual barriers to new habits of
mind. Explanation of the Kuhnian paradigm resides
here; paradigms are maintained by habits of mind
shared by a community. Paradigm shifts occur when
some unique barrier (perhaps in only one or a few
people) has such strength that it motivates search for a
way around an anomaly. If found, these ways become
new habits of mind, and a new paradigm is in the making.
The present book seeks to apply this view by showing
that case studies of scientific controversy can yield to
analysis in terms of habits of mind. Four such cases are
covered: the overthrow of phlogiston by the oxygen
theory (25 pp.), the emergence of the concept of prob-
ability (18 pp.), the overthrow of Ptolemaic astronomy
by Copernicus (76 pp.), and a brief account of Hobbes'
differences with Boyle (17 pp.). Margolis uses the phlo-
giston story to illustrate his method, arguing that the no-
tion of barriers can better account for resistance to the
oxygen theory than previous historical accounts. The
probability story exemplifies the converse point, that new
insights can be blocked by the absence of a unique
habit, in this case, the notion of "counting" things that
haven't yet occurred, e.g., the chance that a pair of dice
will come up with a seven. Each of these two cases is
presented with great depth but little elaboration; they
will be clear to the general reader but hard to read
critically unless you are already quite knowledgeable
about the specific histories in question. As for the Hobbes
and Boyle chapter, this will be the least satisfactory for
the general reader, because here Margolis is really aiming
at another target; the social constructivist account of
science. I'll say more about that later, because it is first
necessary to take account of the heart of the book,
which deals with the overthrow of Ptolemaic astronomy
during the Copernican Revolution.
For the Ptolemaic theory, Margolis first provides a
tutorial chapter that serious readers will appreciate; it is
nothing less than a short course in the qualitative basics
of pre-Copernican astronomy. Shorter and less
comprehensive than Kuhn's magisterial (and uncited!)
Copernican Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1957),
Margolis' precis is, nonetheless, remarkable—concise,
clear, and capable of evoking the reader's wonder at
the richness of the old astronomy. This chapter will cost
time, but it will be time well-spent! Ptolemy's earth-
centered cosmology was accompanied by an elegant
analysis of planetary motion into deferents (orbits around
the sun, which is itself orbiting the earth) and epicycles
(orbits of the planets themselves around points on the
deferents). Epicycles thus ride around on deferents, like
small clocks carried on the hands of a larger clock. The
scheme accounts for the otherwise baffling retrograde
motion of the planets and is amazingly close to the ob-
servational data. Margolis lets the non-specialist reader
gain some rough entry into the elegance of the solution.
The Ptolemaic system is, on his account, dependent
upon habits of mind; the epicycles were "seen" as real
by its adherents. Since it worked so well, how did
Copernicus' account overturn it? As Kuhn had shown,
the usual argument, that the heliocentric solution is
simpler, does not account for the overthrow of the
Ptolemaic system; until Kepler's innovation {elliptical
orbits), either solution, sun-centered or earth-centered,
still required epicyclic motion to account for the
observations. Why switch, particularly when the great
Polish astronomer's alternative demands a counter-
intuitive earth motion to make it work? Margolis's claim
is that this can be understood if we examine the habits
of mind that became part of astronomy's way of
"seeing" the Ptolemaic system and the barriers that these
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imply. To make his claim work, Margolis describes some
variants of the Ptolemaic account, one based on a dif-
ferent scaling of the sizes of the orbits, and one based
on an inversion move in which the epicycles become
larger than the deferents (like a large clock riding the
hands of a small clock). By contrast, Copernicus carried
out a sliding move, sliding the center of the system to
the sun position, rather than the earth position. Here
Margolis appeals to the reader's own ability to "see" such
motions and to see that the small-on-large motion of
the traditional Ptolemaic account, the large-on-small
motion of the "inverted" Ptolemaic account, and the
shifted sun position with epicycles and earth motion
produce equivalent observed motions. For Ptolemaic
"seers," of course, "seeing" the earth motion would have
been exceptionally hard.
Tycho Brahe tried a "compromise" between Ptolemy
and Copernicus, a partially inverted system, by putting
the earth back in the center, with the sun and moon in
orbits around the earth and the planets fixed on large
epicycles whose center was the sun (Ironically, Margolis
does not describe this system, though he mentions it
frequently—the reader is supposed to already know it,
but will need to reference at least Kuhn's earlier book to
get the point). The Tychonic solution was a temporary
partial step that even Tycho abandoned; Margolis raises
the issue of why no one in the traditional camp worked
out a completely inverted system. The reason no one
tried this, he says, is the relative complexity of the moves
for those whose habits of mind were already partly
Copernican. In fact, the Copernican move was already
in the works by the time of Tycho's innovation; those
whose habits of mind had started to lead them in Coper-
nicus' direction had no inclination to try a different
Ptolemaic solution and hence no motive to develop a
completely inverted Ptolemaic system.
It is hard not to be impressed by the cleverness with
which Margolis approaches these issues and the argu-
ments are compelling indeed. Even so, one gets the odd
feeling here that positing "what-ifs" is a dangerous way
to approach historical analysis—and Margolis relies very
heavily on his invented Ptolemaic system to make his
case. This is a key to the major weakness of the book: the
problem with positing barriers to thought is that one
must then provide evidence showing that something
exists because something else doesn 't exist. And to then
invoke the barrier as an explanation for the absence of
something is awkward and possibly circular—rather like
arguing that people can't remember events from in-
fancy because of repression and then using the mech-
anism of repression to explain why people don't
remember events from infancy!
Even so, the case at hand does exemplify the positive
side of Margolis' argument, the claim that different habits
of mind are manifested in Ptolemaic and Copernican
world views. Indeed they are, and the reader who takes
the time to follow the argument will gain something
like a direct experiential verification of the claim. If it is
harder to assent to the account of barriers, we can readily
accept and applaud the notion of paradigms as cogni-
tive psychological in character.
Among recent scholars, however, there are those who
would disagree. In particular, recent sociological accounts
of science (and especially the now-notorious "Strong Pro-
gramme" associated with Edinburgh University) have at
times denied that anything psychological is needed for
any level of description in science studies. Margolis pre-
emptively attacks this position with his account of the
differences between Hobbes and Boyle on the "spring of
the air." Boyle, of course, is justly famous for his air pump
experiments confirming the weight of the air and the in-
verse relationship between volume and pressure. At the
time, however, philosopher Thomas Hobbes disagreed.
For him, the experimental effects found by Boyle were
the consequence of the movement of weightless particles
of air-and the volume of air was fixed, like that of water.
Margolis does not cover the case in great detail be-
cause his target is not Boyle (or Hobbes) but a more
recent work, one of the "classics" of recent social
constructivism, Shapin and Schaffer's Leviathan and the
Air Pump (Princeton University Press, 1985), a book
which has received much critical acclaim for its adroit
account of the emergence of experimentation as a social
activity. For Shapin and Schaffer, truth has a social
history, one that, in this instance, "yields a rich harvest of
political and social maneuvering" (Margolis, p. 162). But
for Margolis their argument is suspect, because they
have mischaracterized Hobbes' true position. Margolis
demonstrates effectively that the position attributed to
Hobbes was in fact only lightly held by him, for only a
brief time, and was not fundamental to his larger
concerns with the nature of natural science. Alas, this
hardly does the job, since, on Margolis' own admission,
Shapin and Schaffer really were not concerned with
Hobbes' own position, but rather with the position
attributed to him by Boyle and his circle. So how can
Margolis' argument that Hobbes has been misread
undercut or limit the force of their argument? He is
right on the historical actuality of Hobbes, but being
right on the point does nothing for his larger claim,
namely, that the social constructivist story is too loose
and too congenial with modern interests. Margolis is on
the side of rational construction as the principal force in
science, not social construction. But his case is not
helped by this attack on Shapin and Schaffer, nor is
their case hurt by it.
In the end, then, Margolis is arguing for a rationally
constructed Kuhnianism. The argument, in spite of my
cavils, is on the whole marvelously well-done and
based on a deep reading of original sources that will
delight the reader on many levels. If it fails to fully
refute its self-defined major opponents, well, we can
forgive it that for its virtues. In the end, it is a serious
and scholarly attempt to restore a psychological
dimension to the reality of scientific thinking, a middle
course between the excesses of the "Strong Programme"
and the excesses of a rationalism that would attribute
scientific change solely to the logical force of observa-
tion and reason. It is not the whole story (nor does it
claim to be), but it is an important and valuable part.
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